We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.
Introduction
From the seventies onwards, the study of strategy-proof mechanisms has been the subject of several papers. In most of these papers negative results are found. In voting theory, Gibbard [1] and Satterthwaite [6] prove that any strategy-proof mechanism is dictatorial. Hurwicz [2] shows that in two-goods, two-person, pure exchange economies, any efficient and individually rational allocation mechanism is manipulable (Le. truth is not a dominant strategy for sorne agent) in sorne economy in the domain, provided that each agent has a positive initial endowment of at least one of the goods, and that a sufficiently wide c1ass of convex preferences is covered (see Ledyard and Roberts [4] for the public good case). However, these results leave unanswered two questions: first, whether similar results are true under different assumptions on the set of admissible preferences and where there are more than two agents and/or more than two goods and second, how large is the set of economies for which truth is not a dominant strategy for sorne agent.
The work ofSaijo [5] and Zhou ([7] , [8] ) addressed the first question. Saijo [5] studies the problem of the existence of strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms when the Pareto efficient condition is obviated, and he proves that there is a non-constant mechanism that satisfies the above two requirements in economies with or without public goods. In the same paper Saijo proves that if the individually rational condition is strengthened, a new impossibility result appears.
More precisely, in public good economies, no strategy-proof mechanism yielding participative allocations exists. An allocation is participative if every participant's bundle is no worse than the best bundle that can be achieved solely by the participant's endowment and technology, without using that of other participants. On the other hand, new proof techniques based on the identification of the geometric properties of the Pareto efficient set, enable Zhou [7] to prove fresh results. He shows that in the domain of pure exchange economies with two agents and arbitrarily many goods in which both agents' utility functions are continuous, strictly concave and increasing, any efficient and non-inversely-dictatorial allocation mechanism is manipulable for sorne economy in the domain. In economies with pure public goods and with continuous and convex preferences, the same author [8] proves that any strategy-proof mechanism is dictatorial whenever the range of the mechanism has, at least, dimension two.
Hurwicz and Walker [3] provide an answer to the second question. Using advanced techniques, they proved that, in economies with quasi-linear utility functions any strategy-proof mechanism defined on a convex and semi-open set of strictly concave and continuous valuations ofthe public goods, will not yield Pareto efficient allocations on any open and dense set of preference profiles, except by producing allocations that lie on the relative boundary of the feasible set. (Notice that a mechanism that gives the total endowment to participant one regardless of the preference announcements of other participants is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient). This result shows that, with the exception of constant mechanisms, under sorne restrictions on the set of admissible preferences, Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness are two generally incompatible requirements.
In this paper we prove a dual result to that of Hurwicz and Walker [3] , in the following sense: they assume that the mechanism is strategy-proof and prove that efficiency is violated almost everywhere and we assume that the mechanism yields efficient and individual rational allocations and we prove that non-manipulability is violated almost everywhere. In other words, we prove that in economies with an arbitrary number of agents, an arbitrary number of public goods and quasi-linear utility functions, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is manipulable for any regular economy i.e., an economy where the valuations of the public goods are strictly concave, e 2 and their Gaussian curvature are non-vanishing (see Theorem 1 below). This result differs from that of Hurwicz and Walker [3] in the assumptions .~we require individual rationality, but we do not assume continuity of the mechanism -and that we use only elementary techniq ues. Furthermore, our Theorem 1 identifies those economies (the regular ones) for which to announce the truth is not a dominant strategy for sorne agent. Hurwicz and Walker did not, since they only obtain a generic result based on the topology they used (we do not know if their result is true for other topologies. AIso, as it is exemplified by the classical example of the rational and real numbers, an open and dense set is not necessarily very big). Moreover, our approach allows for a graphical representation when there are two agents and one public good. Finally, we show that our result remains true without using linear economies, that is, restricting the domain of the mechanism to the regular economies. It goes without saying that it is very easy to adapt our argument and to show that in exchange economies with an arbitrary number of agents, an arbitrary number ofprivate goods and quasi-linear utility functions, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is manipulable for any regular economy (appropriately defined).
The rest of this note goes as follows. The next Section explains the model and the main definitions and Section 3 gathers our main results.
The model and definitions
There are n agents in the society. There is one private good (it is sometimes helpful to think of this good as "money"), and there are m public goods. Public goods are produced from the private good by means of a constant returns to scale technology represented by a linear cost function c(.). A consumption for agent i is a pair (X¡,y)ElR~+mwhere X¡ElR+ is the private good he consumes on his own, and YElR";. is the vector of public goods. Let (w¡, O)ElR~+m be agent i's initial endowment (i.e., we assume that there are initially no public goods). Let
(W¡ -X¡) = e(y) } be the set offeasible allocations. Each agent i has a preference relation defined over lR~+m represented by a quasi-linear (on money) utility function, that is, U¡: lR~+m ---+ lR such that u¡(x¡, y) = v¡{y) + Xi' Let U¡ be the (exogenously given) set of admissible preferences for agent i. U denotes the product space U = U 1 X ... X Un' A generic point U = (U 1 , . .. , Un) in U is called a preference profile. Sometimes we will refer to UEU as an economy, and this will be written as (u¡, u_¡), where U_¡ = (u1"",U¡-1'
An economy UE U is said to be regular iffor all i = 1, ... , n, v¡(.) is e 2 and strictly concave with non-vanishing Gaussian curvature 1 . Let us denote by U R the space of all regular economies. Let U L be the space of alllinear economies.
Given an economy UE U, a feasible allocation (x, y) is Pareto efficient for u if no other feasible allocation (x', y') exists such that u¡(x;, y')~u¡(x¡, y) for all i with strict inequality for at least one agent. Notice that the efficient vector of public goods is unique for any U since preferences are quasi-linear.
Given an economy UE U, a feasible allocation (x, y) is individually rational for u if u¡(x¡, y)~u¡(w¡, O) for all i.
An allocation (XL, yL) is a Lindahl allocation for UE U, if it is feasible and there is a price vector p¡ElR";. one for each i such that,
An allocation (XM,yM) is called a monopoly point for UEU when agent i behaves 1 Our results remains true if we redefine a regular economy as one such that v(.) is conca ve and e 2 for aH agents and it has a non-vanishing Gaussian curvature for at least two agents. [1] as a monopolist ifit is feasible and there is a price vector PjEIR.";'. one for eachj such that Since the cost function is convex, condition (3) and (3') can be replaced by 
A mechanism f is individually rational if for any UE V, f(u) is an individually rational allocation for u.
A mechanism f is strategy-proof if for any agent i, any UE V and any U;E Vi'
uiCf¡(uj,u_¡»?: u¡(.f¡(u;,u_».
A mechanism f is non-manipulable at profile u if for any agent i, and any U;E Vi'
u¡(.f¡(u¡, u _¡» ?: u¡(.f¡(u;, u _¡}).
Notice that the latter of these two definitions is weaker than the former and is the one which will be used in Theorem 1 below. Thus, our results are stronger, for example, than the one obtained by Ledyard and Roberts [4] , because they use the former definition.
The main result
We start this section proving that given a regular economy, the agent who behaves as a monopolist is strictly better off in the monopoly allocation than in the Lindahl allocation (see Lemma 1 below) . This Lemma will be used to prove our main result (Theorem 1).
Lemma 1: Given a regular economy UEV, ir (xtt,yM)>>O and (Xi-,yL) »0, then
Proof. Since (XL, l-) is the Lindahl al/ocation fór u, l-sati4ies:
is the al/ocation obtained ifagent i behaves as a monopolist. we obtain that, 2 Vector inequalities », >, ;:::.
[2] 
Therefore,~o [2] . Since y L satisfies [1] , this implies that
y L )~u¡(x¡-t, y M ), then it is enough to prove that u¡(xT, y L ) #-u¡(x¡-t, y M ). Suppose that u¡(xT, y L ) = u¡(x¡-t, y M ). Then y L must satisfy
m 02 V1 (y L ) L . L L Yk=O, J=l, ... ,m 1*¡k~l 0YkOYj Let v(y) = V 1 (y) + ... + V¡-l + V¡+ 1 + ..
. + Vn(y). Since V¡ is strictly concave for all i,
vis strictly concave. Then we can write [3] Given a regular economy UE U (see Figure 1) In Theorem 1 we have proved the impossibility of truthful behavior on the set of regular economies when efficiency and individual rationality are imposed on the mechanism. It is easy to show that the set of strictly concave functions with nonvanishing Gaussian curvature is dense, with the Punctual Topology, in the set of concave functions. Thus, the set of regular economies is dense in the set of admissible preferences. Therefore an individually rational and Pareto efficient mechanism is manipulable almost everywhere.
An examination of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that whenever a regular economy is considered, an agent has incentives to deviate announcing an appropriate linear utility function. By the aboye observation about the density of the regular economies, it is possible to carry out the proofby taking only strictly concave (with non-vanishing Gaussian curvature) valuations of the public goods, Le. Theorem 1 remains true if the set of admissible preferences is restricted to be the set of regular economies.
